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COLORADO "BUYER BROKERAGE": DOES IT
STILL EXIST AFTER VELTEN v. ROBERTSON?
ROBERT G. NATELSON
I. BUYER BROKERAGE
Traditionally, the role of the real estate broker in a real estate
sale or leasing transaction has been to represent the seller.' The
agreement under which the seller and broker mutually consent to
this agency is a "listing agreement."2 In some states, the local stat-
ute of frauds requires that in order for a listing agreement to consti-
tute an enforceable contract, it must be memorialized in a signed
writing.3 However, in most jurisdictions the common law rule is still
in effect: an enforceable listing contract may be written, oral,4 or
implied by the circumstances.5
Under the terms of the typical listing agreement, a seller or
landlord engages to pay to the broker a commission if the broker
procures a purchaser or lessee ready, willing, and able to purchase or
lease the seller's or landlord's property upon the terms and condi-
tions specified in the listing agreement. 6 The commission payable is
usually calculated on the basis of a fixed percentage of the sales
price or rent.
Despite the usual role of the real estate broker as an agent for
the property owner, it has also been recognized that a broker may
quite properly act as an agent for a prospective property purchaser.
In such a situation, the broker's usual task is to procure for his buyer
a property that meets the latter's specifications. 7 While hitherto bro-
i. Janes v. CPR Corp. 623 S.W.2d 733, 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), reh'g denied.
2. Leiter v. Fleetwood Realty Corp., 95 Ill. App.3d 212, 419 N.E.2d 519 (1981).
3. E.g., in Indiana, Texas, and Idaho. Century 21 Quality Properties, Inc. v. Chandler,
103 Idaho 193, 646 P.2d 435 (Id. Ct. App. 1982); Gerardot v. Emenhiser, 173 Ind. App. 353,
363 N.E.2d 1072 (1977); Janes v. CPR Corp., 623 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
4. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967); Osborn
v. Razatos Realty Co., 158 Colo. 446, 407 P.2d 342 (1965).
5. A few of the many cases on this point include Fletcher v. Garrett, 167 Colo. 60, 445
P.2d 401 (1968); Klipfel v. Bowes, 108 Colo. 583, 120 P.2d 959 (1942); Bennett v. H.K.
Porter Co., 13 Ill. App.3d 528, 301 N.E.2d 155 (1973); Weinberg v. Desser, 243 Md. 347, 221
A.2d 66 (1966); Wills v. Alcorn, 636 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Janes v. CPR Corp.,
623 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
6. See Fletcher v. Garrett, 167 Colo. 60, 445 P.2d 401 (1968).
7. Lester v. Marshall, 143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 786 (1960); Kurtz v. Farrington, 104
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ker representation of purchasers has been more common in other
fields of brokerage,8 there has been a growing interest in the real
estate profession in the possibility of increased representation of buy-
ers.9 The term generally used to denote such representation is "buyer
brokerage."
There is as yet no universal acceptance of the exact scope of the
term "buyer brokerage." It is clear that a "buyer's broker" is one
who searches for acceptable properties for a prospective purchaser
and guides him through the intricacies of the sales transaction. Be-
yond that restrictive usage, the term has been applied to any of the
following situations:
(1) The broker locates a property for the buyer by using the
services of a Multiple Listing System (MLS), negotiates with the
listing agent, and is paid a share of the commission due from the
seller to the listing agent.
(2) Identical to (1), except that an MLS is not employed.
(3) The broker locates a property for the buyer, negotiates di-
rectly with the unrepresented seller, and is paid a commission di-
rectly by the buyer.
(4) Identical to (3), except that the seller is represented by an-
other broker.
As one can see, the potential identification of the "buyer's bro-
ker" with the interests of the seller declines as one moves down the
list. Some real estate professionals would employ the term "buyer
brokerage" to include only Situations (3) and (4), that is, where the
purchaser pays a commission directly to his broker. However, the
term is occasionally applied to all four situations, and at least one
court decision can be cited in support of the term being utilized to
describe Situation (2).10
Situations (1) and (2), where the seller's commission is split, are
commonly called cooperative (or "co-op") arrangements. In such an
arrangement the broker accepting the listing is denominated the
"listing broker" and the one finding the buyer is called the "selling
broker." To avoid confusion the latter will be uniformly designated
herein by the phrase "buyer's broker."
Conn. 257, 132 A. 540 (1926); Baskin v. Dam, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 702, 239 A.2d 549 (1967);
Timmerman v. Ankrom, 487 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. 1972).
8. See. e.g., McCornick & Co. v. Tolmie Brothers, 42 Idaho 1, 243 P. 355 (1926)
(stockbroker representing buyer).
9. So much so that the Colorado Real Estate Commission is considering issuing a state-
approved "buyer brokerage" contract form. At this writing, the form is in draft stage.
10. See infra, note 12.
[Vol. 55
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The reader is encouraged to understand the structure of these
four situations thoroughly before proceeding.
Inherent in the concept of "buyer brokerage" is the notion that
a prospective purchaser should be able to employ a real estate agent
to represent the purchaser's interests as opposed to those of the
seller. The purchaser in Situation (1), for example, who asks a real
estate broker to assist him in finding a property may think of the
broker as "his broker," but in fact the broker is the agent or sub-
agent of the seller and owes fiduciary duties to the seller. The ration-
ale for this position appears to be that one who elects to attempt to
sell property listed within an MLS system does so with the consent
of the individual who placed the property in that system, and is paid
by that individual."' Accordingly, to the extent the buyer's broker in
Situation (1) attempts to represent the purchaser, he places himself
into a conflict of interest.
While there is authority from an Arizona court that in Situation
(2) the buyer's broker is the buyer's agent," this is apparently not
the rule in Colorado. The official Real Estate Manual of the Colo-
rado Real Estate Commission (the state authority regulating real es-
tate brokers and salesmen) states that when a listing broker consents
to share his commission with a buyer's broker, "[t]he consent of the
listing broker is by custom considered tantamount to an employment
or subagency agreement to share in any commission due the listing
broker."13
One may perhaps question the reasoning of this policy. The
buyer's broker is likely to have a more substantial relationship to the
prospective purchaser than to the seller. Also, one may question the
Real Estate Commission's policy's compliance with existing case law,
especially in light of the Arizona decision mentioned earlier.1 4 Nev-
ertheless, the Colorado Real Estate Commission certainly has the
power to implement its understanding of agency relationships in the
real estate industry,1' and one must conclude therefore that the doc-
trine that the buyer's broker is the subagent of the seller in "cooper-
ative" arrangements is, for practical purposes, the law in Colorado.
Whatever the status of the law in Situations (1) and (2), before
11. Chamberlain v. North Central Inv. Corp., 432 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
reh'g denied.
12. Buflington v. Haas, 124 Ariz. 36, 601 P.2d 1320 (1979).
13. STATE OF COLORADO, REAL ESTATE MANUAL pt. 3, at 6 (2d Printing, June 1,
1982).
14. See supra note 12.
15. See generally CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 12-61-101 to -122 (1978).
1983]
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the 1983 Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Velten v. Robert-
son,18 it seemed probable that the buyer's broker in Situations (3)
and (4) represented solely the interests of the buyer. Certainly that
was the holding of the bulk of applicable case law. The decision in
Velten, however, substantially upset that assumption, and raised seri-
ous questions as to whether a commissioned real estate broker in
Colorado could ever exclusively represent a buyer.
II. DECISION IN Velten v. Robertson
Velten arose in a "Situation (3)" setting. According to the facts
as set forth by the Court of Appeals, Ms. Robertson was the owner
of an apartment building in Jefferson County, Colorado. In 1979 she
was contacted by one Zimmerman, a sales agent for Woodside Re-
alty, who inquired as to whether she would be interested in selling
her property. Zimmerman apparently was aware that Brady and
Velten, the prospective purchasers, were in the market for good in-
vestment property.
Ms. Robertson indicated that she might want to sell, but re-
fused Zimmerman's request for an exclusive listing on the property.
There is no indication as to whether a non-exclusive listing was sug-
gested, but seemingly none was given.
Zimmerman nevertheless suggested to the buyers that they
make an offer to purchase Ms. Robertson's real estate. They agreed,
and signed a proposal prepared by Zimmerman. He carried it to the
seller's home. She raised several objections, but signed the offer,
thereby converting it into a contract. Two days later the parties also
signed an addendum modifying the contract to meet Ms. Robertson's
stated objections.
In the course of these negotiations, the broker and buyers
agreed that the buyers would take sole responsibility for paying the
broker's commission. This was understood by Ms. Robertson, how-
ever, the exact nature of the commission arrangement was not dis-
closed to her. Under that arrangement, the buyers were to execute a
note payable to the salesman in the amount of $5,000, secured by a
deed of trust on the property. The deed of trust would be attached to
the building when it was transferred to the purchasers. Moreover, if
the property were to be sold in the following year, the salesman
would be entitled to fifty percent of the buyers' profits.
Sometime after the contract was signed, Ms. Robertson an-
16. 671 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
[Vol. 55
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nounced her refusal to convey the building to the purchasers. Ac-
cordingly, both they and the broker sued her for specific
performance.
The salesman's action in taking a personal interest in the prop-
erty without informing the seller probably violated a provision of
Colorado law which empowers the Colorado Real Estate Commis-
sion to censure, suspend, or revoke the license of any real estate
agent for "claiming, arranging for, or taking any secret or undis-
closed amount of compensation, commission, or profit or failing to
reveal to his principal or employer the full amount of such licensee's
compensation, commission, or profit. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 17
Note that the part of this provision before the disjunctive "or"
implies disclosure to be necessary to all parties in the transaction,
even those who are not principals of the broker.18
Perhaps surprisingly, the court did not refer to this provision in
rendering its decision denying specific performance. Instead, it em-
ployed a theory of agency to deny the broker his commission and to
refuse enforcement of the sale to the purchasers.
Although the trial court had found the broker to be the agent of
the buyers but not of the seller, the Court of Appeals reversed the
latter finding. To the contrary, it held that the salesman (and there-
fore Woodside Realty, his employing company) was also an agent of
the seller as a matter of law. In the course of its discussion, the court
mentioned that the salesman had contacted the owner, told her he
had a buyer, prepared the contract, and procured the signatures of
the parties. Two of these factors were apparently deemed sufficient,
since uncontradicted, to establish agency with the seller as a matter
of law: (a) that the salesman had contacted the seller, and (b) that
he had obtained the signatures of both the buyers and the seller.
While the court acknowledged that the broker's commission was
to be paid exclusively by the purchasers, it did not deem that fact to
be as important as the combined weight of factors (a) and (b),
above. "[T]he establishment of an agency relationship," ruled the
court, "does not stand or fall on a determination of whether a com-
mission was to be paid.""
Once the court had found seller-broker agency, a fiduciary rela-
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-113(q) (1978).
18. While the Commission has not issued an explicit interpretation of this section, a
review of Commission Rule E would seem to support the interpretation suggested herein. See
REAL ESTATE COMM'N RULES 4 C.C.R. 725-1, Rules E(5)(b), (18), and (19) (1983).
19. 671 P.2d at 1012.
1983]
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tionship followed. The court then described the salesman's non-dis-
closure as a breach of that fiduciary relationship. 0 The next step
was to impute this breach to the buyers themselves, and therefore to
deny them specific performance. There is no indication in the case
that a cause of action for damages had been stated, or whether, if it
had, it was a subject of the appeal.
III. ISSUES IN Velten RELATING TO BUYER BROKERAGE
There are essentially two issues arising out of the decision in
Velten that have significant implications for the future of "buyer
brokerage." The first of these is the court's ruling that the salesman
had acted as an agent for the seller as well as for the buyers. The
second issue is the decision of the court in denying specific perform-
ance to the buyers because of the broker's non-disclosure. Each of
these will be discussed in detail.
A. The Agency Ruling
As noted above, the Velten court held that the broker was, as a
matter of law, the agent of the seller because he (1) had contacted
the seller, and (2) had obtained both her signature and those of the
buyers upon the contract of sale. While conceding that the broker
was to be paid by the purchasers, the court ruled that the source of
compensation was not controlling on the question of agency, and
cited the Colorado Court of Appeals case of Hickam v. Colorado
Real Estate Commission as support."a
Hickam was a real estate broker who had been disciplined by
the Real Estate Commission for, inter alia, unduly favoring one pro-
spective purchaser over another to the detriment of his own seller-
principal. In affirming the action of the Commission, the Hickam
court quite properly brushed aside the appellant's protestations that
he was not being compensated by the favored purchaser. It pointed
out that one can represent the interests of a party, to the detriment
of one's own principal, without receiving compensation for such
representation.22
The Hickam case arose out of circumstances somewhat differ-
ent from those found by the Court of Appeals in Velten, since in
20. The existence of a fiduciary relationship between broker and principal is, of course,
unquestionable, M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34 Colo. App. 320, 527 P.2d 912 (1974), as is the duty
of disclosure to a principal. Williams v. Wagers, 117 Colo. 141, 184 P.2d 497 (1947). See also
Janes v. CPR Corp., 623 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
21. 36 Colo. App. 76, 534 P.2d 1220 (1975).
22. Id. at 82, 534 P.2d at 1224.
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Hickam the broker's sole principal was also his sole source of com-
pensation. However, there are a number of cases which, on closer
facts, do agree with the Velten court that compensation is not deter-
minative of an agency relationship."
Yet although agency does not (in the court's words) "stand or
fall" upon compensation, it is nonetheless true that compensation is
one factor, and an important one, in determining the existence of an
agency relationship. In real estate brokerage, as in most other kinds,
"[a] broker ...is ordinarily the agent of the person who pays
him."24
The court in Velten evidently decided, therefore, that the two
other factors of (a) contacting the seller, and (b) obtaining the par-
ties' signatures, were sufficient indications of agency to override the
fact that the seller paid the broker nothing.
The other major authority cited in Velten to support the ruling
that the broker was the agent of the seller was M.S.R., Inc. v.
Lish.' According to the Velten decision, the conditions in Lish were
similar to those in Velten (except that in Lish the seller was to pay a
commission), and just as Lish concluded that an agency relationship
existed between seller and broker, the same was true in Velten.
Examination of Lish, however, reveals that the case may have
been not so much one of actual agency, as of estoppel. Ms. Lish, the
property owner, was approached by a salesman and asked if she
wished to sell her property. The salesman (Regan) affirmed that he
had a buyer for her, and she consented to sell. She then signed a
contract of sale under which she also agreed to pay the salesman's
broker a ten percent commission. As it turned out, the buyer,
M.S.R., Inc., was a corporation controlled by the salesman himself
together with the principal of his employing broker (Mansfield). This
fact was not revealed to Ms. Lish.
The seller soon repudiated the contract with M.S.R., Inc., and
the corporation proceeded to sue her for specific performance. On
appeal, the seller was permitted to rescind on grounds of breach of
fiduciary duty. The reasoning of the court was as follows:
23. E.g., Kurtz v. Farrington, 104 Conn. 257, 132 A. 540 (1926); Jones v. Herr, 39 Or.
App. 937, 594 P.2d 410 (1979); The Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d
370, 384 P.2d 796 (1963).
24. Nix v. Dunavant, 249 Ark. 641, 460 S.W.2d 762, 764 (1970). See also Coons v.
Gunn, 263 Cal. App. 2d 594, 69 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1968); Bennett v. H.K. Porter Co., 13 Ill.
App. 3d 528, 301 N.E.2d 155 (1973); W.W. Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn.
App. 1977).
25. 34 Colo. App. 320, 527 P.2d 912 (1974).
19831
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Regan, acting in his capacity as a licensed real estate broker
and as an employee of Mansfield Realty Co., was the agent
of defendant [seller]. He contacted defendant and told her he
had procured a buyer, he prepared the contract, he obtained
the signatures of the parties, and his employer, Lloyd Mans-
field, was to receive a broker's commission under the terms of
the contract. Regan is therefore estopped from denying the
agency relationship. (citation omitted)."
As this passage illustrates, there is some uncertainty as to whether
the court in Lish was basing its holding upon actual agency or estop-
pel - that is, whether Regan was really an agent of the seller or
was merely estopped from denying it. However, among the factors
cited in support of its holding the most significant appears to be the
one absent in Velten: that the contract the broker drafted recited his
position as agent and provided for payment of a commission to his
firm. In other words, Regan's affirmative representation, the critical
element of estoppel, was of crucial significance. This conclusion is
reinforced by a review of the decision cited by the Lish court as its
authority, McCornick & Co. v. Tolmie Brothers,2 7 which is essen-
tially an estoppel case. Thus, there was an important factor in Lish
quite absent in Velten, and the Velten court's reliance upon the Lish
decision was misplaced.
There is a considerable body of case law concerning when a real
estate broker is, and is not, an agent for the seller. Many, but not all,
of these cases have arisen in the context of brokers suing to collect
commissions. Generally, the decisions specify that in order for there
to be an agency relationship between seller (or purchaser) and bro-
ker, there must be a finding of a contract (or at least of a "meeting
of the minds") between them for the agent's services. 8 This agree-
ment may arise upon the principal's ratification of the broker's unau-
thorized acts,2' but its existence is generally a question of fact, a
jury question,30 on which the party alleging agency has the burden of
26. 34 Colo. App. 322, 527 P.2d at 914, citing McCornick & Co. v. Tolmie Bros., 42
Idaho I, 243 P. 355.
27. 42 Idaho 1, 243 P. 355 (1926). See also the application of estoppel theory in dicta in
Lester v. Marshall, 143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 786, 790 (1960).
28. Brewer v. Williams, 147 Colo. 146, 362 P.2d 1033 (1961); Baskin v. Dam, 4 Conn.
Cir. Ct. 702, 239 A.2d 549 (1967); Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Drovers Nat'l Bank, 80 Iii.
App.3d 867, 400 N.E.2d 614 (1980).
29. Janes v. CPR Corp., 623 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
30. Weinberg v. Desser, 243 Md. 347, 221 A.2d 66 (1966). See Fletcher v. Garrett, 167
Colo. 60, 445 P.2d 401 (1968); Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977),
[Vol. 55
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proof.31 To the extent that the appellate courts have spoken on the
issue, it does not appear that the Velten factors of contract and ob-
taining signatures are conclusive or, perhaps, even sufficient to cause
the case to be referred to a jury.
In Bennett v. H.K. Porter Company, Inc.32 a real estate broker
contacted a lessor who, he believed, might have had commercial
space available for a potential lessee. There were substantial negotia-
tions between the parties as a result of this contact, and the broker
agreed to look to the lessee for his commission. Nevertheless, when
the lessor arbitrarily broke off negotiations, the broker commenced
suit against the lessor, claiming that it was acting as the lessor's
agent also, and therefore entitled to compensation.
The appeals court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the broker.
It pointed out that agency is not created "when the principal merely
allows the broker to take part in negotiations" concerning the prop-
erty, especially where the principal never accepts the broker as his
agent or agrees to pay a commission, "even though the broker has
played a significant part in the transaction."3
Of course in Velten, unlike Bennett, the seller did ultimately
sign a contract, but otherwise the circumstances of compensation
and non-acceptance of a listing were identical."
An even clearer precedent is to be found in Norville v. Palant,
an Arizona case.3' There, a buyer was represented by a broker who
managed, after much negotiation, to procure a contract from a
seller, Norant. The broker, through two salesmen, negotiated the
deal over several weeks. At one point, the seller offered to pay the
broker a commission on the sale, but apparently the actual commis-
sion was paid by the buyer.'
Subsequent to signing, and as part of a larger lawsuit, the seller
alleged that the broker had failed to disclose to him certain facts
regarding the deal, in violation of the broker's alleged fiduciary duty
to the seller. The court found no such fiduciary duty. Rather, it
cert. den. mem.
31. Baskin v. Dam, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. at 708,239 A.2d at 552.
32. 13 Il1. App. 3d 528, 301 N.E.2d 155 (1973).
33. Id. at 532, 301 N.E.2d at 158.
34. The actual signing of a contract upon terms negotiated by the broker is generally not
deemed to be a necessary condition of receiving a commission. Absent a contrary provision in
the listing agreement, the broker earns a comission upon finding a "ready, willing, and able"
buyer. Thus the existence of an agency relationship in no way turns on actual contract execu-
tion. Brewer v. Williams, 147 Colo. 146, 362 P.2d 1033 (1961). Thus the only real point of
distinction between Velten and Bennett is rendered irrelevant.
35. 25 Ariz. App. 606, 545 P.2d 454 (1976).
19831
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noted the broker-principal relationship between broker and buyer
and the buyer's failure to consent to the broker representing the
seller as reasons for its holding.3 It dismissed the seller's offer to pay
a commission as immaterial.
Thus in Norville, both of the Velten factors were present: there
was contact between broker and seller, and the broker procured all
parties' signatures on the contract of sale; yet the Norville court de-
cided that the broker was not an agent of the seller.3 7
Timmerman v. 'Ankrom ,8 8 a 1972 Missouri case, represents an-
other buyer brokerage decision in which the broker was held to have
no fiduciary obligations to the sellers. In Timmerman, a broker
(Dudley) representing an interested purchaser, presented first one,
and then another, offer to Mr. and Mrs. Ankrom (plaintiffs), the
owners of a farm. The broker initially contacted the Ankroms, pre-
pared the offers, negotiated an acceptable price, prepared the final
contract, and procured the signatures of all parties. In fact, the final
contract even provided for the Ankroms to pay a commission. Yet,
after revi/ewing the evidence the court upheld the trial court's finding
that the broker was working exclusively for the buyer:
There is no direct evidence to show that Dudley was repre-
senting the seller as agent for him. As said in Smith v. Piper
. . . "By the very nature of a broker's work he must deal
with both buyers and sellers." It is only when he deals for
both buyer and seller without disclosing that fact that the
transaction is deemed constructively fraudulent in equity. 9
(Emphasis in original.)
Thus despite the existence of the Velten factors of contact and
signature procurement (and even commission), the Timmerman
court found "no direct evidence" to show an agency relationship be-
tween broker and seller.
To be sure, a commission arrangement was held to be sufficient
evidence of agency (or at least of estoppel) in M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish,40
36. On the impossibility of properly representing both parties without the informed, ex-
plicit consent of both, see Warren v. Mangels Realty, 23 Ariz. App. 318, 533 P.2d 78 (1975)
(where buyer knew of agent's representation of seller and that seller had not consented to
agent's representation of buyer, buyer could not claim agent represented him as well).
37. Norville, 25 Ariz. App. 606, 545 P.2d 454 (1976).
38. 487 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. 1972).
39. Id. at 571. See also Brean v. North Campbell Professional Bldg., 26 Ariz. App. 381,
548 P.2d 1193 (1976) (the fact that the listing agreement contained seller's promise to pay the
commission upon the sale of the property did not make broker the seller's agent).
40. 34 Colo. App. 320, 527 P.2d 912 (1974)
[Vol. 55
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and in the California case of Coons v. Gunn," where the sellers ini-
tially refused to employ the broker, but subsequently signed a sales
contract wherein they specifically acknowledged the broker as their
agent and agreed to pay a commission. 4 ' But this writer has uncov-
ered no case which has gone as far as Velten and found agency as a
matter of law upon the bare factors of broker contact and signature
procurement. To the contrary, as one Tennessee court has held,
[t]here is a considerable difference in the legal effect of say-
ing to a broker:
(1) You are authorized to try to sell my farm; and
(2) I will sell my farm on these terms to anyone. If you
produce such a buyer, I will sell to him; but you will have to
get your commission from him. 4'
In the first instance, as the court points out, an agency relation-
ship is created; in the second, it is not."
Despite the existence of the authority of the Bennett, Norville,
Timmerman, Coons, and Billington cases, none of them were cited
or distinguished in Velten. Whether they were actually considered by
the Velten court is therefore unknown. It is clear, however, that the
Colorado Court of Appeals has adopted a much more slender basis
for a legal finding of agency than any of the courts that decided the
available precedents.
B. Imputation of the broker's non-disclosure to the buyers
Upon determining that the buyers' broker had breached his
fiduciary duty to the seller, the Velten court declined to order spe-
cific performance for the benefit of the buyers. The specific language
of the court is as follows:
If, as here, the agent by the conveyance will acquire an equi-
table or beneficial interest in the property, then the agent
must specifically disclose the nature of that interest to his
principals. . . .The buyers were both parties to the contract
which gave the beneficial interest to the salesman, and they
may not now seek to disavow their responsibility for the
41. 263 Cal. App. 2d 594, 69 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1968).
42. Cf Century 21 Quality Properties, Inc. v. Chandler, 103 Idaho 193, 646 P.2d 435
(Id. Ct. App. 1982), (where a similar clause was held insufficient to satisfy the Idaho Statute
of Frauds) petition for review denied mem.
43. Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied
mem.
44. Id.
1983]
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salesman's failure to disclose this interest to the seller. 5
The authority cited by the Velten court for this statement was
M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish,46 in which, it will be recalled, a broker (Mans-
field) and his agent (Regan) failed to disclose to their seller that the
buyer was a corporation in which they held a controlling interest. In
Lish the court found that because of this controlling interest, the
brokers' breach of fiduciary duty would be imputed to the buyer.
This seems to be a point well-established in law.4
In Velten, however, the buyers were unrelated to the broker, ex-
cept for the shared-appreciation structure of the broker's commis-
sion. While there is a line of authority authorizing rescission even in
such circumstances, it would seem unduly harsh in this case. There
is no evidence that the Velten buyers were or ever had been real
estate brokers or that they were aware of the broker's duty of dis-
closure.4 8 Nor is there any evidence cited by the court that the buy-
ers viewed the broker as the seller's agent. In the cases authorizing
rescission against unrelated buyers, the agency of the broker to the
seller appears to have been unquestioned, or there was a co-conspir-
acy by the purchasers with the agent to benefit from what everyone
should have understood was a breach of duty.4 9
Perhaps a better remedy in Velten would have been for the
court to decree the broker a constructive trustee of his illegal profits,
with the seller as beneficiary, while enforcing the interests of the in-
nocent buyers.80
IV. PUBLIC POLICY EFFECTS OF Velten
At this point, Velten is mandatory authority only in Colorado.
Hence in analyzing its probable effect, this discussion will be limited
to Colorado.
As a result of Velten, it is unlikely a prospective purchaser of
real property can employ a real estate broker on a commission basis
45. 671 P.2d at 1012.
46. 34 Colo. App. 320, 527 P.2d 912 (1974).
47. The Lish decision relies on both Williams v. Wagers, 117 Colo. 141, 184 P.2d 497
(1947) and Treat v. Schmidt, 69 Colo. 190, 193 P. 666 (1920).
48. This fact has been confirmed in personal conversation with one of the buyers.
49. See, e.g., Wells v. Francis, 7 Colo. 396, 4 P. 49 (1884); Smith v. Seattle L.S. & E.
Ry. Co., 25 N.Y.S. 368 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
50. Colorado recognizes and has applied the remedy of constructive trust in cases where
a fiduciary has breached a duty to a principal. Unicure, Inc. v. Thurman, 42 Colo. App. 241,
599 P.2d 925 (1979), cert. den. mer.; Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P.2d 187 (1932). See
also Gruenwald v. Mason, 139 Colo. 1, 335 P.2d 879 (1959) (remedy recognized but not
applied).
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with full confidence that the broker will be able to avoid conflicts of
interest. As noted above, in those cases in which the "buyer's bro-
ker" is to be paid a share of the listing broker's commission (Situa-
tions (1) and (2)), he had, even before Velten, been considered an
agent of the seller.
The Velten case involved a fact pattern fitting within the frame-
work of Situation (3): the buyer pays his own broker; the seller has
none. Since, realistically, it is impossible for a broker in Situation
(3), hoping to earn a commission, to avoid contacting the seller and
procuring the seller's name on the contract, it follows perforce that a
broker in Situation (3) must be an agent of the seller alone or, at
best, a dual agent."'
It is not certain if the Velten rule applies to Situation (4), in
which each party has a broker and each pays his own commission.
Certainly it could be argued that the rule does not so apply because
(a) the existence of a seller's broker may tend to negate a showing of
intent that the buyer's broker will act for the seller, and (b) the
buyer's broker will not have the kind of direct contact with the seller
he had in Velten. But it is also possible to argue the contrary by
pointing out that in the usual "co-op" situation the buyer's broker is
the seller's sub-agent, and while in most "co-op" arrangements the
buyer's broker is paid by the seller, the Velten court obviously
thought little of the probative power of compensation arrangements.
Moreover, it can be argued, there is little difference between contact-
ing the seller and contacting his agent. To the contrary, in such situ-
ations the seller's broker is merely deputizing the buyer's broker to
sell the property for him. By this approach, then, the rule in Velten
could be extended to Situation (4) cases as well.52
More telling in practical consequences than purely legal argu-
ments, however, is this fact that when a buyer's broker sets out to
search for a property he may not know whether the best property for
his purchase is listed with another agent. If it is not so listed, he runs
the risk of falling against the Velten tripwire. If he shuns unlisted
properties, he violates his fiduciary duty to his buyer. If a suitable
property is listed, the broker may or may not be subject to the
Velten decision, depending on whether the argument of the preced-
ing paragraph is adopted by subsequent court rulings.
The practical effect of the Velten conflict of interest situation
51. The possibility of avoiding this result through draftsmanship is discussed infra.
52. See supra notes 10 and 12.
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can be seen in the following example:
A employs a Broker, B, to locate for him a good investment property.
B approaches 0, whose property is on the market at a somewhat
under-valued price. (In an investment real estate context, a low price
means a higher rate of return.) If B informs 0 of the undervaluation,
he breaches his duty to A to locate the best possible investment. If B
does not inform 0 of the undervaluation, he breaches his fiduciary
duty to 0. Moreover, as O's agent, B should not only inform 0 of the
undervaluation, but, affirmatively suggest ways in which it can be
sold for more!
One way a prospective purchaser could escape this dilemma
would be to employ a broker as a real estate consultant and under-
take the direct contacts with property owners himself. Under these
circumstances, however, the broker will not be legally permitted to
draft the relevant documents necessary for the sale since doing so
constitutes the practice of law. A broker in Colorado does have a
limited right to practice law by drafting real estate documents, but
only where he is the "agent of sale" in a transaction and charges no
drafting fee except his pre-set commission." This implies that, in
addition to employing a broker on a consulting basis only, it will be
necessary for the documents of sale to be prepared by an attorney.
Real estate brokers are required by the Colorado Real Estate
Commission and encouraged by the Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Realtors to recommend that sellers and buyers employ
legal counsel."' However, in this author's experience as a real estate
practitioner, this is often not done. Moreover, even when consulting
legal counsel is recommended by brokers, purchasers and sellers,
who often have an exaggerated idea of the cost of legal services, fre-
quently do not follow this recommendation." Hence one positive ef-
fect of the Velten case may be to encourage purchasers at least, if
not sellers, to employ legal counsel before signing a contract. This
would have the salutory effects of better protecting purchasers' legal
rights, and of reducing the volume of real estate litigation in
53. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Assoc., 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998
(1957); Op. Atty. Gen. (Colo.), Dec. 12, 1967.
54. COLORADO REAL ESTATE COMM'N Rule E(14); National Ass'n of Realtors, Code of
Ethics, art. 17, § 21; STATE OF COLORADO, REAL ESTATE MANUAL § 19, at 3, § 21, at 24, and
§ 22 (2d Printing, June 1, 1982).
55. Natelson, Legal Counsel Vital in Real Estate Sale, Denver Post, Dec. 6, 1981, § 6,
at 12; for a reported case in which a broker failed to recommend employment of legal counsel,
see Lester v. Marshall, 143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 786 (1960).
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Colorado.5
On the other hand, the advantages of these effects may be out-
weighed by the inability of purchasers to employ commissioned
agents to represent their interests exclusively, and by the inability of
brokers to offer their services as representatives of buyers' interests.
The employment of an attorney-consultant team, while possible, still
compels the buyer to negotiate on his own behalf or through his at-
torney. Neither the seller nor his lawyer may have the specialized
real estate market knowledge possessed by most brokers. The Velten
court's creation of this dilemma for buyers would seem inconsistent
with the "freedom of choice of agent" policy that has previously
been enunciated by the Colorado Supreme Court.5 7
One possible way to minimize the effect of Velten is for a
buyer's broker to induce the seller to sign a statement acknowledging
(1) that the broker represents only the buyer, and (2) that the seller
has the right to employ his own real estate and legal advisors. Be-
sides the fact that some sellers may be unwilling to sign such a state-
ment, there are other problems inherent in that procedure from the
point of view of the buyer and his broker. First, the statement would
have to be signed no later than the time of contract. Second, poten-
tial abuse of such disclaimers may induce the courts to apply stan-
dards to them comparable to disclaimers of warranties under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 8 or to disclaimers of warranties of hab-
itability and workmanship.59 This development would subject such
disclaimers to the same kind of uncertainty and litigation which has
accompanied warranty disclaimers. Third, one could not be certain,
in the absence of decided cases, at what point such a disclaimer or
acknowledgement became effective. If the statement were signed at
the time the sales contract was signed, a seller might well argue that
a buyer's broker was also his fiduciary in the course of the preceding
negotiations. If it were signed still earlier, but after some discussion
between the parties, different standards for the "before" and "after"
negotiations might have to be applied. The potential result of such
uncertainty is a system in which a buyer's broker shoves a disclaimer
form at a seller along with his business card, and refuses to speak
56. Natelson, supra note 55.
57. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 416, 312 P.2d
998, 1007 (1957).
58. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 and 2-316 (1978).
59. See, e.g., Belt v. Spencer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 585 P.2d 922 (1978); Herlihy v. Dun-
bar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980); Sallinger v. Mayer, 304
So.2d 730 (La. App. 1974); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W. 2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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with him before he signs it.
V. CONCLUSION
The overall result of Velten v. Robertson is to limit effective
corhmissioned real estate brokerage in Colorado to the representation
of sellers. Real estate purchasers must understand that commis-
sioned brokers are prevented by law, or uncertainty about the law,
from representing buyers' interests alone or, perhaps, buyers' inter-
ests at all, and that it is the responsibility of potential buyers to de-
vise such arrangements as they can for acceptable substitute proce-
dures. Whether these substitute procedures can fully replace the
buyer's commissioned broker who serves only his own client is a mat-
ter of substantial doubt at this point.
Unfortunately, a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Colorado
Supreme Court sought by the buyers in the Velten case was recently
denied. Under the circumstances, the Colorado General Assembly or
the Real Estate Commission may find remedial action worthwhile.
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